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INDEPENDENT EXTERNAL REVIEW
OF HEALTH MAINTENANCE 
ORGANIZATIONS’ MEDICAL-
NECESSITY DECISIONS
WENDY K. MARINER, J.D., M.P.H.
TATES may have more freedom to regulate the
practices of managed-care organizations than
many observers previously believed. In the ab-
sence of congressional action on the federal Bipartisan
Patient Protection Act,1 the primary source of patient-
protection legislation remains at the state level. Never-
theless, the federal Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act (ERISA) of 19742 restricts state regulation
of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) that
serve private employee group health plans. On June
20, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Rush Prudential
HMO, Inc. v. Moran, upheld an Illinois state law that
requires binding independent external review when an
HMO disagrees with the decision of a patient’s phy-
sician that a treatment is medically necessary.3 The Mo-
ran decision clarifies the states’ authority, and may
allow physicians a larger say in decisions about man-
aged-care coverage.
STATE REGULATION AND ERISA
Forty-one states and the District of Columbia have
laws requiring independent external review of denials
of benefits by HMOs, although these laws vary in
what types of decisions they apply to, who conducts
the review, what rules the reviewers must use, and
whether reviewers’ decisions are binding (Table 1).
Their general purpose is to ensure that decisions about
an individual patient’s care are made on the basis of
sound medical judgment rather than financial or busi-
ness considerations alone. The Illinois law applies in
very narrow circumstances. Section 4-10 of the Illinois
Health Maintenance Organization Act requires HMOs
licensed in Illinois to submit benefit denials to an in-
dependent physician reviewer (unaffiliated with the
HMO and jointly selected by the patient, the patient’s
physician, and the HMO) “in the event of a dispute
between the primary care physician and the [HMO]
regarding the medical necessity of a covered service
proposed by a primary care physician.”4 If the inde-
pendent reviewer decides that the treatment is med-
ically necessary — and if it is a covered service under
S
the HMO contract — the HMO is required to pro-
vide the covered service.4 
Laws such as this one are typically part of a state’s
statutes licensing health insurance companies, HMOs,
preferred-provider organizations, and Blue Cross and
Blue Shield.5 States — not the federal government
— have historically regulated insurance.6 State regu-
lation failed to protect employees from the loss of pen-
sions, however, so Congress enacted ERISA in 1974
to set national standards for employers who voluntarily
offered pension plans to their employees.7,8 To achieve
national uniformity, Section 514 of ERISA supersedes
(“preempts”) any state law that “relates” to an ERISA
plan.9,10 (An ERISA plan is any plan created by a pri-
vate employer, group of employers, or union, with a
few exceptions, to offer pensions, health coverage, or
other benefits to employees.11) More than 125 million
Americans obtain health care financed by ERISA
plans.12,13 The preemption by ERISA limits the ap-
plication of state licensing statutes and other laws in
complicated ways, making it hard to predict whether
certain laws protect all the patients in a state.14,15
MORAN’S DISPUTE WITH RUSH
PRUDENTIAL
Deborah Moran was a member of Rush Pruden-
tial HMO, an HMO licensed under the Illinois act.
Her husband’s employer sponsored a fully insured
ERISA plan that provided memberships in this HMO
for employees and their dependents. Moran saw Dr.
Arthur LaMarre, her Rush network primary care phy-
sician, for pain, numbness, and loss of mobility in her
right shoulder in 1996. Conservative measures, such
as physiotherapy, that were recommended by Dr.
LaMarre did not relieve these symptoms. On her own,
Moran saw Dr. Julia Terzis, an out-of-network sur-
geon in Virginia, who diagnosed brachial plexopathy
and the thoracic outlet syndrome, a nerve-compres-
sion syndrome, and recommended decompression by
removal of the uppermost rib, extensive scalenectomy,
and microneurolysis (removal of scar tissue around the
injured nerves) of the brachial plexus under micro-
scopical magnification.
Moran asked LaMarre to obtain Rush’s approval
for Terzis to perform this surgery. Two Rush-affili-
ated surgeons confirmed the diagnosis of the thorac-
ic outlet syndrome but recommended standard sur-
gery, with less extensive scalenectomy and neurolysis
and no microneurolysis. Moran believed Terzis’s ap-
proach offered a better prognosis, and LaMarre told
Rush that Moran would be “best served” by Terzis’s
surgery. Rush denied approval because Terzis was not
a Rush network physician. Moran appealed, and Rush
again denied approval, after consulting the literature
and its two surgeons, who confirmed that microneu-
rolysis was not necessary. Instead, Rush approved
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*The state law applies to all coverage decisions made by the health maintenance organization.
†The state law applies only to determinations about medical necessity.
‡The state law applies only to determinations about medical necessity or the experimental nature
of treatment.
§The decision resulting from the independent external review is binding on the health maintenance
organization.
TABLE 1. STATES WITH LAWS REQUIRING INDEPENDENT EXTERNAL REVIEW.
STATE OR DISTRICT
INDEPENDENT
REVIEW
REQUIRED
ALL
DECISIONS*
DECISIONS ABOUT
MEDICAL
NECESSITY†
DECISIONS
ABOUT MEDICAL
NECESSITY AND
EXPERIMENTAL
TREATMENT‡
BINDING
REVIEW§
Alaska X X X
Arizona X X X
California X X X
Colorado X X X
Connecticut X X X
Delaware X X X
District of Columbia X X
Florida X X
Georgia X X X
Hawaii X X
Illinois X X X
Indiana X X X
Iowa X X X
Kansas X X
Kentucky X X X
Louisiana X X X
Maine X X X
Maryland X X
Massachusetts X X X
Michigan X X X
Minnesota X X X
Missouri X X X
Montana X X X
New Hampshire X X X
New Jersey X X X
New Mexico X X X
New York X X X
North Carolina X X
Ohio X X X
Oklahoma X X
Oregon X X
Pennsylvania X X X
Rhode Island X X X
South Carolina X X X
Tennessee X X X
Texas X X X
Utah X X X
Vermont X X X
Virginia X X X
Washington X X X
West Virginia X X X
Wisconsin X X X
Total 42 11 19 12 34
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standard surgery for the thoracic outlet syndrome,
to be performed by a Rush network surgeon.
Moran demanded that Rush submit the dispute
for independent external review under section 4-10
of the Illinois Health Maintenance Organization Act,
but Rush did not do so. The next month, Moran
underwent surgery performed by Terzis, paying the
$94,841.27 charge herself. She then claimed reim-
bursement from Rush, which denied the claim after
conducting another review with additional physicians.
Finally, Moran filed suit in Illinois state court and
won a judgment forcing Rush to submit to independ-
ent review. An independent physician reviewer found
that the surgery, including microneurolysis, was med-
ically necessary. Moran then asked the state court to
require Rush to reimburse her for the cost of the sur-
gery. Rush moved the case to federal court, claiming
that it did not have to comply with the independent
review because ERISA preempted section 4-10 of
the Illinois act.16 
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Supreme Court did not decide whether Mo-
ran’s preferred treatment was in fact medically nec-
essary — a question on which reasonable people
might disagree. The question before the Court was
whether Rush had to comply with the Illinois law and
submit to independent review. The Court held that it
did, in a five-to-four opinion written by Justice David
Souter, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Sandra
Day O’Connor, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen
Breyer.3
The Court’s decision turned on a technical analy-
sis of ERISA preemption. ERISA does not preempt
state laws that regulate insurance. However, state laws
that relate to ERISA plans, as the Illinois law did in this
case, can be enforced only if they qualify as regulating
the “business of insurance,” which is a term of art.17,18
It does not include everything an insurance company
happens to do but, rather, is limited to traditional in-
surance practices such as accepting and spreading fi-
nancial risk, underwriting, and making decisions about
coverage.19-21 The Court has used two tests to deter-
mine whether a law regulates insurance. First, under
the so-called common-sense test, the law must be di-
rected specifically at the insurance industry and not
commerce or contracts in general.20 Rush argued that
HMOs are not engaged in the business of insurance
because they provide medical care. The Court reject-
ed that argument, finding that HMOs also provide in-
surance by accepting fixed premiums and taking on
the financial risk of providing care. Thus, state laws
that regulate insurance functions can be applied to
HMOs, as to other insurers.
Under the second test, the state law must target
one of three key characteristics of insurance: the trans-
fer or spread of a policyholder’s risk, the policy rela-
tionship between the insured and the insurer, or
practices limited to the insurance industry specifical-
ly.18,20,22,23 The Court found that section 4-10 of the
Illinois HMO Act affects the second — the policy
relationship between Moran, the insured, and Rush,
the insurer — by adding a mandated term to the
policy. Moreover, the independent review required
by the Illinois law entailed interpreting the insurance
policy, which the Court said was “at the ‘core’ of the
business of insurance.”3 The Illinois law also targeted
the third characteristic, since HMO policies are insur-
ance policies. Therefore, the Illinois law qualified as in-
surance regulation and was not preempted by ERISA,
so Rush was required to comply with independent ex-
ternal review.
Rush then argued that even if the Illinois law was
not preempted by ERISA because it regulates insur-
ance, it conflicted with another ERISA provision and
should not be enforced. ERISA section 502(a) grants
plan participants the right to sue the ERISA plan to
enforce their rights under the plan or to recover the
dollar amount of any wrongfully denied plan benefit
(i.e., the cost of a medical or diagnostic procedure, but
not compensation for personal injuries, such as lost
wages or additional medical expenses).24,25 Earlier
Supreme Court decisions held that participants in an
ERISA plan cannot use state law to obtain a remedy
for denied benefits that section 502(a) does not pro-
vide, such as punitive damages.26-29 Rush interpreted
these decisions to mean that the states could not re-
quire HMOs to use any other method of resolving
disputes with participants in an ERISA plan, including
state-mandated independent review or arbitration.
Uncertainty about whether ERISA forbids any dis-
pute-resolution methods except a lawsuit under sec-
tion 502(a) has bedeviled the states,14,30-32 prompted
federal regulations regarding new internal-review pro-
cedures,33 and encouraged the pending federal legis-
lation that would require independent review for all
ERISA plans.1 
The majority of the Court rejected Rush’s argu-
ment, resolving much of the uncertainty. The Court
ruled that section 502(a) does not address preemption
at all. The fact that section 502(a) provides a remedy
for denied benefits does not mean that ERISA auto-
matically preempts a state law. The Court also noted
that the Illinois law did not actually give ERISA plan
participants an additional remedy. It merely required
the HMO to use an additional level of appeal before
finally denying benefits. If an HMO refused to sub-
mit to independent review, a patient like Moran could
bring a lawsuit under section 502(a) to force compli-
ance with independent review. If an HMO refused to
pay covered benefits, the patient would still have to
bring a lawsuit under ERISA section 502(a) — not
state law — to collect payment. Thus, the law was con-
sistent with ERISA and applied to Rush.
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION
The Moran decision opens the door to more ex-
tensive state regulation of HMOs. There is no doubt
that states are free to regulate the quality of medical
care and medical practice, because medical care itself
does not relate to ERISA plans.34-37 ERISA plan par-
ticipants may sue physicians for malpractice because
medical judgment is not related to ERISA plans.38-40
What the Moran decision clarified is that states are
also free to regulate insurance as a way to regulate the
practice of medicine and protect the quality of care.
This might include imposing professional standards
for the quality of care offered by HMOs or requiring
coverage of medically necessary care as a mandated
benefit. These requirements should increase the role
of physicians in determining the quality of care that
must be provided as part of an HMO policy.
The decision indicates that the majority of state
laws requiring independent review of benefit denials
can be enforced against HMOs. Although Illinois’s
law was narrow — applying only to disputes over
medical necessity between an HMO and a physician
— the Court’s reasoning appears applicable to broad-
er state laws. My analysis of state laws reveals that 19
states, including Illinois, currently limit the require-
ment of independent external review to disputes about
medical necessity (Table 1). An additional 12 states
require independent review only for disputes about
medical necessity and about whether a treatment is
experimental. All these state laws should be enforce-
able against HMOs.
Ten states and the District of Columbia have in-
dependent-review laws that appear also to apply to
disputes over the interpretation of the scope of cov-
erage or an insurance contract (Table 1). In 2000, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a Texas
law requiring independent external review in cases of
disputes over benefit coverage, concluding that it
provided an alternative remedy that conflicted with
ERISA section 502(a).41 In Moran, the Supreme
Court rejected the same argument by Rush. Four
days later, it unanimously vacated the Fifth Circuit
Court’s decision and sent it back for further consid-
eration in the light of the ruling in Moran.42 Thus,
further proceedings may determine whether deci-
sions about coverage that do not depend on medical
judgment about medical necessity may be subject to
independent review under state law.
Nine states have no law requiring independent ex-
ternal review of HMO benefit denials. The Moran de-
cision may encourage these states to adopt such laws.
Surveys show that the public favors independent re-
view of benefit decisions.43 The Court appeared to
agree, by drawing an analogy between independent
review of decisions about medical necessity and the
practice of getting another physician’s medical opin-
ion. It also hinted that state law might forbid HMOs
from writing contracts that reserve for the HMO the
sole authority to make decisions about medical ne-
cessity.
The Supreme Court has now made clear that state
independent-review laws can apply to HMOs that sell
their own policies to fully insured ERISA plans. (Fully
insured ERISA plans provide health benefits to em-
ployees by buying a group health insurance policy
from an insurance company or HMO; employees re-
ceive whatever benefits the HMO’s policy covers.)
The question is whether such laws may also apply to
HMOs that merely administer self-funded ERISA
plans. The Court did not have to decide this question,
because Moran’s ERISA plan was fully insured.
An estimated 40 percent of all participants in ERISA
plans are in self-funded plans.12 Self-funded (or “self-
insured”) ERISA plans do not buy insurance policies
from an HMO. Instead, the ERISA plan itself pays for
health care services directly out of plan assets (i.e., em-
ployer and employee contributions). Most self-funded
ERISA plans hire an HMO, for a fixed fee, to admin-
ister the health benefits under the plan and to make
decisions about coverage, because the employer has
no particular expertise to do so.44
The Court’s reasoning suggests that states could
require all HMOs that make coverage decisions to pro-
vide independent external review as a condition of li-
censure, at least when the decision involves questions
of medical judgment. The Court found that making
benefit decisions is a core insurance function and that
laws regulating how such decisions are made qualify as
insurance regulation and are therefore not preempt-
ed by ERISA. It also noted that there was “nothing
standing in the way” of applying this insurance ex-
ception from preemption by ERISA to HMOs that
provide only administrative services to a self-funded
ERISA plan.3 Therefore, states should be able to re-
quire HMOs that make final decisions about cover-
age for ERISA plans to use independent external re-
view (although they could not require ERISA plans
themselves to do so).
This interpretation may depend on whether the
HMO has the ultimate authority to make final judg-
ments about medical necessity and benefit coverage.
Some self-funded ERISA plans give HMOs the dis-
cretion to make final, binding decisions about benefits,
but others do not. If the ERISA plan does not grant
the HMO the discretion to make final decisions, then
the HMO’s administrative functions might not qualify
as the “business of insurance” and therefore would not
be subject to state laws regulating insurance. If this in-
terpretation is correct, an HMO could avoid com-
pliance with independent-review laws by refusing to
accept ultimate decision-making authority on behalf of
a self-funded ERISA plan. Alternatively, a self-funded
ERISA plan could retain the right to approve any
decision made by an HMO, so that the HMO would
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not have to comply with a requirement for independ-
ent review. In effect, the terms of the administrative-
services contract between the ERISA plan and the
HMO could determine whether or not a state insur-
ance law applied to the HMO. The contract terms
might not change how coverage decisions are made in
practice, but they would be likely to control whether
patients in self-funded ERISA plans are entitled to
independent review. This elevates form over substance,
but it is an inevitable product of the split federal–state
jurisdiction over insurance that ERISA created in the
first place.
CONCLUSIONS
The Moran decision is consistent with ERISA’s
original design, which kept the business of insurance
under state jurisdiction and placed ERISA plans them-
selves under federal law even though they use insur-
ance to provide employee benefits. In Moran, the Su-
preme Court makes clear that it is no longer prudent
to assume that HMOs are exempt from state insur-
ance regulation merely because they serve ERISA
plans. In particular, HMOs that serve fully insured
ERISA plans must comply with state laws requiring
independent review of determinations of medical ne-
cessity. HMOs that administer self-funded ERISA
plans may also have to comply if they make binding
decisions about coverage. However, deciding what
counts as insurance regulation that is enforceable
against HMOs that serve ERISA plans remains a
highly technical exercise.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Moran may encour-
age increased state regulation of HMOs and reduce
pressure on Congress to enact federal legislation pro-
viding national standards for independent external re-
view, liability, and other aspects of managed care. This
raises the policy question of whether managed-care
practices are best regulated at the state or federal level.
Only federal legislation can require nationally uniform
rules for all patients and physicians.
I am indebted to Carrie Buchanan for research assistance in cat-
aloguing and analyzing state laws regarding independent external
review.
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